California Punitives by Horvitz & Levy
  • Oregon Supreme Court rules against Philip Morris (again)

    Believe it or not, the Williams case is still going.  For anyone who missed it, Williams is the case in which an Oregon jury awarded $821,500 in compensatory damages and $79.5 million in punitive damages.  The case bounced around in the appellate courts for years; the Oregon Supreme Court kept ruling against Philip Morris and the U.S. Supreme Court kept granting certiorari.  On the third trip to the U.S. Supreme Court, certiorari was dismissed after oral argument, leaving the judgment intact.

    Philip Morris paid the plaintiffs in 2009.  That payment included 40 percent of the punitive damages award.  The plaintiffs only got 40 percent because Oregon has a split recovery statute that requires the defendant to pay 60 percent of any punitive damages award to the state (as discussed here.)

    Philip Morris argued that it shouldn’t have to pay the state in this case because Oregon gave up its right to collect further punitive damages from Philip Morris in 1998, when Oregon signed on to a master settlement between the states and the tobacco companies.  Philip Morris won that argument in the intermediate appellate court but, as reported by the Associated Press, the Oregon Supreme Court reversed and ordered Philip Morris to pay Oregon it’s 60 percent share of the $79.5 million punitive damages award.

    As a result of this decision and the California Supreme Court’s denial of review in Bullock, Philip Morris’s parent Altria Group Inc. will record a $119 million fourth-quarter charge, per this report in today’s Wall Street Journal.

  • Oregon Supreme Court Hears Arguments In Another Tobacco Case with Huge Punitive Award

    Oregon has been a major battleground in punitive damages litigation in recent years, a trend that shows no signs of letting up. As we noted last week, the Oregon Supreme Court has agreed to decide a certified question from the Ninth Circuit regarding the application of Oregon’s split-recovery statute. Before the Oregon Supreme Court gets to that issue, however, it will decide Schwarz v. Philip Morris, described in this Statesman Journal article: State high court ponders award in cigarette lawsuit.

    As the article reports, the jury in Schwarz awarded $150 million in punitive damages and $169,000 in compensatory damages. The trial court reduced the punitive damages to $100 million. The Court of Appeal reversed the punitive damages award in its entirety, ordering a new trial because the trial court had improperly refused Philip Morris’s request to instruct the jury not to punish for harm to nonparties.

    It will be interesting to see what the Oregon Supreme Court does with Schwarz. Remember, this is the same court that refused to order a new trial in Philip Morris v. Williams even after the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the jury instructions in that case were inadequate to protect the defendant’s due process rights.

  • Another Editorial Criticizing Dismissal of Cert in Williams III

    Today’s LA Times contains an editorial entitled The Supreme Court and Law Left Hanging. The editorial makes the same point as this editorial we blogged about last week, namely, that the Supreme Court should have used Williams III as a vehicle for clarifying and strengthening the limits on excessive punitive damages. Neither editorial mentions that the excessiveness issue was not before the court in Williams III because the Supreme Court declined to consider that issue when it granted certiorari last June.

  • “Court Missed Opportunity to Limit Punitive Damages”

    So says this Reading Eagle editorial about the Supreme Court’s dismissal of cert. in Williams III.

  • Cert. Dismissed in Williams III

    The U.S. Supreme Court has issued an order dismissing certiorari as improvidently granted in Philip Morris v. Williams (Williams III), which was argued last December (click here to view the transcript). As readers of this blog will recall, the issue before the court was:

    Whether, after this Court has adjudicated the merits of a party’s federal claim
    and remanded the case to state court with instructions to “apply” the correct constitutional standard, the state court may interpose–for the first time in the litigation–a state-law procedural bar that is neither firmly established nor regularly followed.

    I certainly didn’t see this dismissal coming. It was apparent from the oral argument transcript that the court was sharply divided, but I guessed that the result would be a 5-4 reversal. Looking back at the transcript, I suppose this comment by Justice Breyer might have been a hint that dismissal was possible: “When I read that petition for cert, I thought this is a run-around, and I’m not sure that I think that now.”

    No one really knows why the court dismissed review (and we may never know), but one of my colleagues, John Querio, has offered this assessment, which makes sense to me:

    It means they realized this issue was tangled up with state law issues that they
    didn’t anticipate (but could have), meaning there was a very good argument that the Oregon S.Ct.’s rationale represented an adequate and independent state ground for the decision, which deprives the USSCT of jurisdiction. I’m guessing the liberals and at least some of the conservatives agreed on this – the liberals because they wanted to preserve the award, and the conservatives because they favor the AISG doctrine in the criminal context and didn’t want to make new and harmful precedent cutting back on that ground to get to the merits of the punitive damages issue here. Such an opinion could have been cited by criminal defense lawyers in the future.

    You can read more about the dismissal at:

    WSJ Law Blog

    Reuters

    Bloomberg

    SCOTUSblog (Observing that, with interest, Philip Morris will now owe over $150 million, but noting that Philip Morris plans to keep the Williams litigation going by challenging the state of Oregon’s claim to 60 percent of the punitive damages award)

  • Findlaw Column: Anthony Sebok Analyzes Williams III Oral Argument

    In his Findlaw column, Professor Anthony Sebok summarizes the history of the Philip Morris v. Williams litigation and offers some cautious predictions about the likely result of that case’s third trip to the U.S. Supreme Court. Prof. Sebok seems to think it’s a close call, but an affirmance is the most likely outcome. His prediction differs from my guess that a 5-4 reversal is more likely.

    Prof. Sebok’s prediction seems to be based on his observation that Justice Breyer, who wrote the opinion in favor of Philip Morris in Williams II, now seems to be leaning towards the plaintiff. I agree that Justice Breyer’s seems inclined to affirm, but I don’t think that necessarily means the plaintiff will win. In my view, Justice Scalia, who dissented from Justice Breyer’s opinion in Williams II, now seems to be clearly leaning towards reversal. If Justices Breyer and Scalia switch sides and everything else stays the same, Philip Morris will prevail again. (Although I’m not as certain about this, I think some of the others, particularly Justices Souter and Thomas, may end up switching sides as well.)

  • Los Angeles Times Compares Oregon Supreme Court to Brown v. Board of Education Foes in the 1950s

    The Los Angeles Times ran an interesting editorial yesterday on the recent oral argument in Williams III. The editorial discussed the tortured procedural history of this case and commented that the Oregon Supreme Court’s recent opinion was problematic: “When the defendant is a much-reviled tobacco company, such an end run might not seem so outrageous. But suppose lower courts in the 1950’s had succeeded in frustrating the implementation of the Supreme Court’s Brown vs. Board of Education decision outlawing segregated public schools? The court forestalled such subversion of its mandate in a 1958 decision emphasizing that ‘the federal judiciary is supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution.’”

    The editorial went on to make an even broader point that many state courts are not following the Supreme Court’s guidance on limiting the size of punitive damage awards: “The primary issue in this third round of litigation is whether Oregon’s highest court circumvented last year’s U.S. Supreme Court ruling. But that obscures another important element in this case: the continuing refusal of state courts to take seriously a series of U.S. Supreme Court decisions warning that punitive damage awards may not be ‘grossly excessive.’ That line of cases began in 1996 with a decision striking down a $4-million award to a physician who sued BMW for not disclosing that a ‘new’ car he had purchased had been repainted. His actual damages were only $4,000. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court hasn’t established a clear rule to determine when punitive damages become disproportionate to compensatory damages. At Wednesday’s argument, Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. suggested that using the Oregon case to make a clear statement about the limits of punitive damages might be the best way to reassert the court’s authority. We agree.”

  • Guessing How the Justices Will Vote in Williams III

    Now that I’ve had a chance to read the oral argument transcript from Philip Morris v. Williams (Williams III), I’m going to offer a few predictions guesses about how the Justices might vote. I don’t purport to have any inside knowledge of the Supreme Court or this particular case, and I didn’t attend the argument. My guesses are based purely on my review of the transcript and some of the briefing, and my familiarity with the Supreme Court’s previous decisions in this area.

    Although the $79.5 million punitive damages award is the engine that’s propelling this litigation, the case is not really a punitive damages case at this point. It’s an appellate procedure case. And the issue presented is peculiar to the U.S. Supreme Court. In that sense, this post is somewhat off-topic for this blog. Nevertheless, for whatever its worth, I humbly offer my guesses about how the justices might vote on this case:

    Justices Ginsburg and Stevens: It seems pretty clear from the transcript that these two are not particularly troubled by the Oregon Supreme Court’s decision on remand. I don’t think I’m going out on a limb by guessing they’ll vote to affirm. I envision them ruling that a state court is free to rely on an independent state law ground for avoiding the constitutional issue in this case, so long as there is no indication that the court came to the independent state law determination in bad faith.

    Justice Breyer: He said he initially viewed the Oregon Supreme Court’s decision as a “run around,” but now he isn’t so sure. He seems to have come around to the view that the decision was a legitimate application of established Oregon precedent, even though he did not find that precedent quite as clear-cut as Williams’ briefs described it. My guess is that Justice Breyer will join Justices Ginsburg and Stevens in voting to affirm on the ground that the Oregon Supreme Court did not act in bad faith by relying on state law to avoid the constitutional issue.

    Justice Souter
    : He seems to be deeply troubled by two countervailing policy concerns arising from the possible outcomes of this case: an affirmance could signal to lower courts that they are free to ignore the Supreme Court’s mandates, but a reversal could improperly interfere with state courts’ discretion by requiring them to consider all state law issues before addressing federal constitutional questions. Justice Souter is also troubled by the unfairness that would result if a party like Williams is barred from asserting a state law argument on remand, even though she asserted that argument throughout the lower court proceedings and had no control over the Oregon Supreme Court’s decision to avoid that issue the first time around. Ultimately, I’m guessing that this fairness concern will cause Justice Souter to vote in favor of affirmance.

    Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia and Kennedy: These three seem prepared to reverse the Oregon Supreme Court’s opinion on the ground that it violated the mandate of Williams II. Justice Kennedy made it clear that he does not share Justice Souter’s concern about interfering with the lower courts’ discretion to decide issues in a certain order. Justice Scalia’s viewpoint is particularly interesting, given that he dissented from Williams II. Presumably, he believes that although Williams II was wrongly decided, the Oregon Supreme Court was bound to follow it.

    Justices Alito and Thomas: These two are wildcards, since they asked no questions at argument. Based on typical voting patterns, I’m tempted to predict that they will vote with the Chief and with Justices Scalia and Kennedy. Justice Thomas, however, has a limited view of the stare decisis doctrine. Based on that view, and the fact that he dissented in Williams II, it is conceivable that he might vote for affirmance. But my instincts say he won’t.

    So the bottom line is, I’m guessing the court will vote 5-4 to reverse the Oregon Supreme Court’s opinion and remand the case with instructions to conduct a new trial with a proper jury instruction along the lines set forth in Williams II.

    Many news reports about the argument have focused on Chief Justice Roberts’ suggestion that the court could avoid the procedural quagmire by deciding on the merits whether the amount of the award violates due process. While an opinion on that issue would be a lot more interesting for purposes of this blog, I think it’s more likely that the Court will limit its opinion to the issue presented. They had two previous chances to decide the merits of the excessiveness issue in this case and they avoided the issue both times. (My co-blogger Jeremy Rosen disagrees with me on this point, and predicts that the Supreme Court will grant cert. on the excessiveness issue.)