California Punitives by Horvitz & Levy
  • Federalist Society Conference Panel: “The Roberts Court and Federalism”

    The second panel at the recent national Federalist Society Conference that had discussions of punitive damages was called “The Roberts Court and Federalism.” The panel was moderated by the Hon. David Sentelle of the DC Circuit Court of Appeals and the panelists included the Hon. Walter Dellinger III, former Solicitor General of the United States, Dean John Eastman of the Chapman University School of Law, Professor Jeffrey Rosen of George Washington University School of Law, and the Hon. Paul Clement, former Solicitor General of the United States.

    Professor Dellinger noted that he sees a tension in two competing visions held by various parts of the “conservative” legal movement between states rights and free markets. He speculated that similar fissures might develop in the “progressive” legal movement during the Obama era between old line liberals who see the states as barriers to civil rights and the broad group of plaintiff’s lawyers and environmentalists who want rigorous state regulation and pro-plaintiff state rules. This change in focus in the liberal legal movement came to the forefront after the massive state attorney general tobacco settlement which showed how attorney generals could become profit centers for their states. Now states rights look more appealing for those who want high punitive damages and greater regulation. Professor Dellinger wonders if this focus on states rights by some in the liberal community will continue when the Obama administration and the Democrats in Congress begin enacting greater regulations at the national level. Once an Obama-run agency determines the “right” balance of regulation, will the states-rights liberals still want to see 50 competing regulatory schemes in the states? And, what will conservative judges do when faced with aggressive federal regulations promulgated by the new powers in Washington?

    Professor Dellinger noted that Justice Scalia’s dissent in BMW and State Farm show he does not believe in using substantive due process to invalidate state decisions even though, as shown by his vote in Exxon Shipping, he clearly believes in the need for limitations on punitive damages.

    Professor Rosen discussed what he referred to as the “constitution in exile” movement supposedly made up of the conservative legal establishment. He also focused on the tensions within the conservative legal movement between states rights and federal power. He discussed a 1984 debate at the Cato Institute between then-Judge Scalia and Professor Epstein of the University of Chicago. Professor Epstein argued that courts should promote economic liberty and Judge Scalia said that the Lochner case should remain dead and that substantive due process should not be revived in any form including promoting economic liberty. Professor Rosen says this tension between states rights conservatives and federal deregulation conservatives continues. He said the BMW v. Gore case is a victory for the deregulation conservatives in that it applied substantive due process to set aside a state punitive damage award. It is a loss for states rights conservatives.

  • Federalist Society Conference Panel: “Civil Litigation Under the Roberts Court”

    At the annual Federalist Society Conference in Washington D.C., there have been numerous interesting panel discussions and speakers. Two of the panels offered interesting insights into punitive damages jurisprudence in the Roberts Court.

    The first panel was moderated by Dean Kenneth W. Starr of the Pepperdine Law School. The panelists were Carter Phillips, nationally known appellate lawyer at Sidley & Austin, Gregory Katsas, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, Robert Peck of the Center for Constitutional Litigation, Dr. Roger Pilon of the Cato Institute, and the Hon. Jerry Smith of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. The official title of this panel was “Civil Litigation Under the Roberts Court,” but many of the panelists discussed punitive damages in some detail.

    Carter Phillips noted that the court is taking a much greater interest in business cases generally and such cases are making up a much higher percentage of cases on the docket. He made the point that in his view there has never been a US Supreme Court opinion that has been more ignored and defied than State Farm v. Campbell in that almost no lower court will give effect to its strong suggestion that a 1:1 ratio is the constitutional maximum in cases of high compensatory damages. He also contended that the Roberts court seems to be avoiding the substantive due process aspect of its punitive damages jurisprudence. He pointed to Williams II, Exxon Shipping and Williams III as cases where the due process ratio argument was raised but the court has declined to reach that question. This continues to leave open the mystery of where Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito stand on this issue. Will they be like the two justices they replaced (Renhquist and O’Connor) or will they be more like Justices Scalia and Thomas who do not believe there is any substantive due process limit on state punitive damage awards (even though they personally believe in a 1:1 ratio as shown in their concurrence in Exxon Shipping‘s common law holding that such a ratio is important).

    Greg Katsas pointed out that he believes the holding in Williams II on the jury instruction required to show juries the appropriate and inappropriate uses for evidence of harm to others (punishment vs. evidence of reprehensibility) is not likely to drive many jury outcomes in a different direction. He believes it is significant that Justice Souter and others embraced the empirical and other reasons for supporting a 1:1 ratio in Exxon Shipping, but it is too soon to tell if this will spill over into the due process cases.

    Robert Peck referred to the court’s punitive damages docket as the modern obscenity cases: the justices know a too high punitive award when they see it. He found it significant that the court upheld a $500 million plus award of punitive damages in Exxon Shipping in a case where they found Exxon had basically been a good corporate citizen after the spill. Thus, the 1:1 ratio is not going to apply in any but the least egregious cases. He thought a very significant aspect of the opinion was its footnote refusing to credit good scholarship because it was funded by Exxon. He also thought the empirical evidence was very telling and demonstrates that there really is no nationwide problem with punitive damages. He says it is only outlier cases that get attention and social scientists would say that society does not need to worry about outliers. Also, the outliers are mostly low compensatory awards which should have higher ratios.

    He mentioned that he had a punitive damage case where the court of appeals had upheld a $17.5 million punitive award on a $2 million compensatory award. The other side filed cert on the 1:1 ratio argument. It was held for 9 months while Exxon Shipping was decided and then was denied a few days later. He believes the 1:1 statement in State Farm was very weak and noted that the Utah Supreme Court on remand in State Farm upheld a 9:1 ratio and the Supreme Court denied cert.

    He then discussed the Williams III case. He is one of the counsel for Williams. He said that the court’s “prurient interest in this case is huge.” He said the majority of focus in the briefing and oral argument of Williams II was on the excessiveness argument, which the court ultimately did not reach. At oral argument, he said Justice Breyer commented that a 100:1 ratio would be ok if Phillip Morris behaved badly enough. He agreed that the court’s approach to harm to non-parties would ultimately have no effect. At oral argument Justice Scalia said sending the case back to Oregon would be pointless because the Oregon courts could reject the proposed instruction on a different ground. This is, of course, what happened and now the case is back at the court. Peck contends that the Oregon Supreme Court simply applied a 92 year old rule in Oregon requiring a proposed instruction to be perfect.

    At the end of the day, Peck thinks if this case went back to trial with the proper instruction, the result will be the same.

  • SCOTUS Grants Cert. in Another Case Involving Punitive Damages Under Martime Law

    According to today’s order list, the U.S. Supreme Court has granted certiorari in Atlantic Sounding Co. v. Townsend, docket number 08-214. As we noted in a previous post, the case involves the availability of punitive damages in maritime cases, specifically, whether a seaman may recover punitive damages against a shipowner for failing to pay “maintenance and cure” (i.e., living expenses and medical costs) for shipboard injuries.

    See: the 11th Circuit’s opinion, the cert. petition, the brief in opposition, and amicus briefs by the American Waterways Operators, the Cruise Lines International Association, and United Maritime Group, all in support of the petitioner.

  • SCOTUS May Consider Another Punitive Damages Issue Arising Under Maritme Law

    A pending petition for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court raises a question involving the availability of punitive damages in maritime cases, specifically, whether a seaman may recover punitive damages against a shipowner for failing to pay for injuries suffered in a shipboard accident. The case, Atlantic Sounding Co. v. Townsend, is featured on SCOTUSblog‘s “Petitions to Watch,” presumably because there is a circuit split on this issue. Even if the Supreme Court grants cert., this case is unlikely to have any impact outside of the maritime context.

    Any readers with a passion for maritime punitive damages issues can read the 11th Circuit’s opinion, the cert. petition, the brief in opposition, and amicus briefs by the American Waterways Operators, the Cruise Lines International Association, and United Maritime Group, all in support of the petitioner.

  • Plaintiff’s Amicus Briefs in Williams III Now Available Online

    We previously posted links to the petitioner’s brief on the merits and supporting amicus briefs in Philip Morris v. Williams (Williams III), as well as the respondent’s brief on the merits. The amicus briefs for the plaintiff/respondent are now available (via the ABA):

    Brief for Federal Procedure Scholars in Favor of Respondent

    Brief for the Oregon Trial Lawyers Association in Favor of Respondent

    Brief for Retired Oregon Supreme Court Justices Susan M. Leeson, Hans A. Linde, Betty Roberts, And Richard L. Unis in Support of Respondent

    Brief for Public Justice, P.C., The Tobacco Legal Control Consortium, The Tobacco Products Liability Project, The Tobacco Control Resource Center, Public Health Advocacy Institute, The Tobacco Trial Lawyers Association, and the American Association for Justice in Support of Respondent

    Brief for the States of Oregon, Delaware, Maryland, Mississippi, New Mexico, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Wyoming in Support of Respondent

    To recap, the issued presented in Williams III is:

    Whether, after this Court has adjudicated the merits of a party’s federal claim and remanded the case to state court with instructions to “apply” the correct constitutional standard, the state court may interpose–for the first time in the litigation–a state-law procedural bar that is neither firmly established nor regularly followed.

    The case will be argued December 3.

  • SCOTUS Rejects FedEx Petition to Review Standard for Awarding Punitive Damages in ADA Cases

    Law.com reports that the US Supreme Court has rejected a cert petition by FedEx seeking review of a 4th Circuit decision (Federal Express Corp. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 513 F.2d 360 (2008)) affirming a jury award of $100,000 in punitive damages. In the suit brought by a deaf package handler pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Baltimore jury found FedEx liable under the “reckless indifference” standard for punitive damages in ADA cases (see Kolstad v. American Dental Association, 527 U.S. 526 (1999)), and the 4th Circuit appellate court rejected FedEx’s argument on appeal that its internal compliance and grievance policies established a “good faith” defense to the claim as a matter of law.

    The 4th Circuit construed the “reckless indifference” standard as not requiring a subjective “bad motive” on the part of the employer, and further held that “the mere existence of an ADA compliance policy will not alone insulate an employer from punitive damages liability.” FedEx challenged that analysis in its petition for certiorari, arguing that the decision “will allow the issue [of punitive damages] to go automatically to the jury in every ADA case involving the interactive process, regardless of the employer’s state of mind in attempting to comply with its obligations.” The EEOC brief in opposition countered that the “reckless indifference” standard in Kolstad required only “consciousness of consequences or of wrongdoing,” and that “an employer can avoid the imposition of punitive damages by demonstrating that it engaged in good-faith efforts to comply with the law.” The EEOC’s press release announced the denial of FedEx’s petition for certiorari last week.

    Note that the compensatory award was only $8,000. As described by Sean Andrussier in the North Carolina Appellate Blog, FedEx challenged the $100,000 punitive award (12.5 times the compensatory award) as excessive on appeal. It does not appear, however, that FedEx renewed that argument in its cert petition. The punitive award was well within the applicable $300,000 statutory cap for damages under the ADA. But as the aforementioned blog post explains:

    The notion that an award is beyond due process review for excessiveness if it falls within a statutory range is misplaced. See, e.g., Kent v. A.O. White, Jr., Consulting Eng’r, P.C., 559 S.E.2d 731, 736-40 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that punitive award that had been reduced by trial court to $250,000 statutory cap remained unconstitutionally excessive and ordering reduction to $85,964).

  • Plaintiff Files Merits Brief in Williams III

    The plaintiff/respondent in Philip Morris v. Williams (Williams III) has filed her brief on the merits. You can view the brief on the ABA’s website here. Links to the petitioner’s brief on the merits and supporting amicus briefs can be found in this post.

    To recap, the issued presented in Williams III is:

    Whether, after this Court has adjudicated the merits of a party’s federal claim and remanded the case to state court with instructions to “apply” the correct constitutional standard, the state court may interpose–for the first time in the litigation–a state-law procedural bar that is neither firmly established nor regularly followed.

    The case will be argued December 3.

  • Erwin Chemerinsky Article on Exxon Shipping Co.: “A Narrow Ruling on Punitive Damages”

    Professor Erwin Chemerinsky, the founding dean of the University of California, Irvine, School of Law, has an article in the September 2008 edition of “Trial,” a publication of the American Association of Justice (formerly the Association of Trial Lawyers of America.) The article (subscription required) describes the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker. Chemerinsky concludes that the Supreme Court’s reasoning should not have much application outside the maritime context:

    Businesses, and those seeking to limit punitive damages, will attempt to read the Court’s holding broadly and apply it in many different contexts. But the Court was clear that it was dealing only with punitive damages in maritime cases. At most, its reasoning can be applied to other areas of federal common law where punitive damages are allowed.
    Yet there’s no doubt that the case reflects a Court that generally is hostile to punitive damages and wants to impose limits, whether based on due process or common law principles. There’s also no doubt that Exxon Shipping is not the Court’s last word on punitive damages.

    For those who don’t subscribe to Trial, you can find the article on Westlaw with this citation: 44-SEP JTLATRIAL 62.

  • U.S. Supreme Court Schedules Oral Argument in Williams III for December 3

    According to the U.S. Supreme Court’s monthly argument calendar for the month of December, 2008, the Court will hear oral arguments in Philip Morris v. Williams (Williams III) on December 3, 2008.

    To recap, the issued presented in Williams III is:

    Whether, after this Court has adjudicated the merits of a party’s federal claim and remanded the case to state court with instructions to “apply” the correct constitutional standard, the state court may interpose–for the first time in the litigation–a state-law procedural bar that is neither firmly established nor regularly followed.

    See our prior post for links to the opening brief on the merits and the various amicus briefs in support of the petitioner.

    Hat tip: SCOTUSblog.

  • The First Batch of Merits Briefs in Williams III Available Online

    Philip Morris and its amici have filed the first batch of briefs on the merits in Philip Morris v. Williams (Williams III). (Click here for our prior post about the grant of certiorari in Williams III. The post contains the issued presented.)

    Links (via the ABA):

    Philip Morris’s opening brief on the merits.

    Amicus brief of Pacific Legal Foundation in support of petitioner.

    Amicus brief of National Association of Manufacturers in support of petitioner.

    Amicus brief of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in support of petitioner.

    Amicus brief of Associated Oregon Industries in support of petitioner.

    Amicus brief of Washington Legal Foundation in support of petitioner.

    Amicus brief of Criminal Justice Legal Foundation in support of neither party.

    Note on terminology: I have been referring to this case as Williams II, even though it’s actually the third time the case has been before the Supreme Court. The first time around the Court simply GVR’d the case without an opinion. The second time around the Court issued an opinion. To me, it makes sense to call the first opinion Williams I and call this case Williams II, since it will generate the second Supreme Court opinion. But several of the briefs linked above refer to the first Supreme Court opinion as Williams II and this case as Williams III. To minimize confusion, I’ll adopt that same terminology from now on.