Law 360 reports that U.S.District Judge Vince Chhabria has reduced a $75 million punitive damages award to $20 million in a Roundup-based lawsuit against Monsanto. The compensatory damages are roughly $5.2 million.
[Disclosure: Horvitz & Levy represents Monsanto in Roundup litigation]
Two years ago a Los Angeles jury awarded $417 million, including $347 million in punitive damages, to a woman who claimed she developed ovarian cancer from talc in Johnson & Johnson’s Baby Powder. The trial court tossed out the punitive damages award, finding that the plaintiffs presented no clear and convincing evidence of malice, fraud, or oppression.
A few days ago, the Court of Appeal (Second District, Division Three) issued this published opinion affirming the trial court’s ruling on punitive damages. It’s an important decision because it deals with a factual scenario that arises frequently in California punitive damages litigation. The basic facts go something like this:
A manufacturer sells a product at a time when someone has posited that an ingredient in the product may increase the risk of cancer, but the issue is a question of scientific debate. The plaintiff uses the product and develops cancer, and seeks punitive damages from the manufacturer on theory that it consciously disregarded a possible risk to human health.
The Court of Appeal explains that such evidence cannot support punitive damages, which must be based on a showing that the defendant was aware of probable dangerous consequences of its conduct. For punitive damages purposes, it is not enough that someone somewhere identified a possible risk from the defendant’s product. If the scientific community had not reached agreement on whether there was an actual risk, then the defendant did not act with malice by selling the product.
So in this case, where the connection between talc and ovarian cancer remains under scientific investigation, the Court of Appeal said the jury could have reasonably concluded the defendant was negligent, but no reasonable jury could find by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant committed the sort of “despicable” conduct that warrants punitive damages.
Significantly, the court explained that scientific studies issued after the plaintiff’s injury could not be used to prove the defendant’s state of mind before the product was sold. “Scientific evidence developed post-injury did not create a reasonable inference that [the defendant] was acting with malice, pre-injury, in failing to warn of probable dangerous consequences of the product.”
While it may seem obvious that studies released in 2013 cannot shed light on a defendant’s state of mind in the 1960s, California case law on this issue has been somewhat unclear. This decision may help dispel some of that confusion.
The LA Times reports that a jury awarded $13.3 million in compensatory damages and $10 million in punitive damages against Huy Fong Foods, Inc., the maker of Sriracha sauce.
The plaintiff is Underwood Ranches, who had supplied Huy Fong with jalapeno peppers. Underwood claimed they suffered dramatic losses when Huy Fong abruptly terminated their contract. The story doesn’t explain the basis for punitive damages, which ordinarily aren’t available in contract disputes.
Two years ago a Los Angeles jury awarded $417 million, including $347 million in punitive damages, to a woman who claimed she developed ovarian cancer from talc in Johnson & Johnson’s Baby Powder. The trial court tossed out the punitive damages award, finding that the plaintiffs presented no clear and convincing evidence of malice, fraud, or oppression.
A few days ago, the Court of Appeal (Second District, Division Three) issued this published opinion affirming the trial court’s ruling on punitive damages. It’s an important decision because it deals with a factual scenario that arises frequently in California punitive damages litigation. The basic facts go something like this:
A manufacturer sells a product at a time when someone has posited that an ingredient in the product may increase the risk of cancer, but the issue is a question of scientific debate. The plaintiff uses the product and develops cancer, and seeks punitive damages from the manufacturer on theory that it consciously disregarded a possible risk to human health.
The Court of Appeal explains that such evidence cannot support punitive damages, which must be based on a showing that the defendant was aware of probable dangerous consequences of its conduct. For punitive damages purposes, it is not enough that someone somewhere identified a possible risk from the defendant’s product. If the scientific community had not reached agreement on whether there was an actual risk, then the defendant did not act with malice by selling the product.
So in this case, where the connection between talc and ovarian cancer remains under scientific investigation, the Court of Appeal said the jury could have reasonably concluded the defendant was negligent, but no reasonable jury could find by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant committed the sort of “despicable” conduct that warrants punitive damages.
Significantly, the court explained that scientific studies issued after the plaintiff’s injury could not be used to prove the defendant’s state of mind before the product was sold. “Scientific evidence developed post-injury did not create a reasonable inference that [the defendant] was acting with malice, pre-injury, in failing to warn of probable dangerous consequences of the product.”
While it may seem obvious that studies released in 2013 cannot shed light on a defendant’s state of mind in the 1960s, California case law on this issue has been somewhat unclear. This decision may help dispel some of that confusion.
The LA Times reports that a jury awarded $13.3 million in compensatory damages and $10 million in punitive damages against Huy Fong Foods, Inc., the maker of Sriracha sauce.
The plaintiff is Underwood Ranches, who had supplied Huy Fong with jalapeno peppers. Underwood claimed they suffered dramatic losses when Huy Fong abruptly terminated their contract. The story doesn’t explain the basis for punitive damages, which ordinarily aren’t available in contract disputes.
The California Court of Appeal commonly reverses punitive damages awards when a plaintiff fails to present meaningful evidence of the defendant’s ability to pay. This unpublished opinion falls into that category, but with an unusual wrinkle.
During trial, plaintiffs’ counsel made some effort tried to introduce evidence of the individual defendants’ finances, by asking them about their historic earnings. The trial court sustained relevance objections to those questions. Plaintiffs’ counsel thereafter made no further efforts to introduce evidence of the defendants’ finances.
After the jury ruled for the plaintiffs and awarded punitive damages, the defendants moved to vacate the punitive damage award on the ground that the plaintiffs had failed to introduce any evidence of the defendants’ finances. The trial court agreed the plaintiffs had presented no such evidence, but denied the defense motion because he blamed himself for the lack of evidence.
The judge explained that he had sustained the defendants’ objections on two grounds: (1) the defendants’ earnings from fifteen years earlier were too remote in time to be relevant, and (2) the court mistakenly thought that the trial had been bifurcated so that financial condition would be presented only in the second phase of trial.
The court was correct on the first ground. For punitive damages purposes, only the defendants’ finances at the time of trial are relevant. But the court was wrong on the second ground. The defendants had not asked for bifurcation.
The trial court concluded that, because of his own confusion regarding bifurcation, the plaintiffs had not received a full and fair opportunity to present their case regarding the defendants’ financial condition. So the court granted the plaintiffs a new trial on the issue of punitive damages
and denied the defendants’ motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
The defendants appealed and the Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reversed. It found that the trial court did nothing to prevent the plaintiffs from meeting their burden of presenting financial condition evidence. The court correctly sustained objections to questions that did not seek current financial condition, and the matter never came up again. Although the court may have believed that the trial was bifurcated, and based on that mistake the court would have sustained objections to other questions about financial condition, the court never explained that to plaintiffs’ counsel, who simply failed to ask any further questions on the issue.
So in the end, the Court of Appeal concluded that the lack of evidence was the plaintiffs’ own fault. The court reversed the order granting a new trial and directed the trial court to enter a new judgment in favor of the defendants on the issue of punitive damages.
The California Court of Appeal commonly reverses punitive damages awards when a plaintiff fails to present meaningful evidence of the defendant’s ability to pay. This unpublished opinion falls into that category, but with an unusual wrinkle.
During trial, plaintiffs’ counsel made some effort tried to introduce evidence of the individual defendants’ finances, by asking them about their historic earnings. The trial court sustained relevance objections to those questions. Plaintiffs’ counsel thereafter made no further efforts to introduce evidence of the defendants’ finances.
After the jury ruled for the plaintiffs and awarded punitive damages, the defendants moved to vacate the punitive damage award on the ground that the plaintiffs had failed to introduce any evidence of the defendants’ finances. The trial court agreed the plaintiffs had presented no such evidence, but denied the defense motion because he blamed himself for the lack of evidence.
The judge explained that he had sustained the defendants’ objections on two grounds: (1) the defendants’ earnings from fifteen years earlier were too remote in time to be relevant, and (2) the court mistakenly thought that the trial had been bifurcated so that financial condition would be presented only in the second phase of trial.
The court was correct on the first ground. For punitive damages purposes, only the defendants’ finances at the time of trial are relevant. But the court was wrong on the second ground. The defendants had not asked for bifurcation.
The trial court concluded that, because of his own confusion regarding bifurcation, the plaintiffs had not received a full and fair opportunity to present their case regarding the defendants’ financial condition. So the court granted the plaintiffs a new trial on the issue of punitive damages
and denied the defendants’ motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
The defendants appealed and the Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reversed. It found that the trial court did nothing to prevent the plaintiffs from meeting their burden of presenting financial condition evidence. The court correctly sustained objections to questions that did not seek current financial condition, and the matter never came up again. Although the court may have believed that the trial was bifurcated, and based on that mistake the court would have sustained objections to other questions about financial condition, the court never explained that to plaintiffs’ counsel, who simply failed to ask any further questions on the issue.
So in the end, the Court of Appeal concluded that the lack of evidence was the plaintiffs’ own fault. The court reversed the order granting a new trial and directed the trial court to enter a new judgment in favor of the defendants on the issue of punitive damages.
We previously reported on the punitive damages awarded against Oberlin college for libel, and the fight between the parties on how to apply Ohio’s cap on punitive damages. The trial court appears to have adopted the plaintiffs’ argument that the cap, which limits punitive damages to twice the amount of compensatory damages, applies to the amount of compensatory damages awarded by the jury, not the amount of compensatory damages after reduction of those damages due to a separate cap on noneconomic damages.
As a result, the court has entered a judgment in the amount of $25 million. The jury awarded $44.2 million and the college was seeking to have it reduced to $14.2 million.
View the judgment here (link courtesy of Legal Insurrection).
We previously reported on the punitive damages awarded against Oberlin college for libel, and the fight between the parties on how to apply Ohio’s cap on punitive damages. The trial court appears to have adopted the plaintiffs’ argument that the cap, which limits punitive damages to twice the amount of compensatory damages, applies to the amount of compensatory damages awarded by the jury, not the amount of compensatory damages after reduction of those damages due to a separate cap on noneconomic damages.
As a result, the court has entered a judgment in the amount of $25 million. The jury awarded $44.2 million and the college was seeking to have it reduced to $14.2 million.
View the judgment here (link courtesy of Legal Insurrection).
We have reported several times about huge punitive damages awards against foreign governments based on acts of state-sponsored terrorism. (See here, here, and here.) These awards are typically entered by default, because the defendant countries usually do not appear to defend themselves. And to my knowledge the plaintiffs have not had any success collecting on these judgments.
Once such award occurred in this case: a federal district court awarded $6 billion in compensatory damages and $4.3 billion in punitive damages against the government of Sudan for its complicity in the 1998 attacks on the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania that killed 224 people. Sudan eventually appeared in the case and appealed the judgment.
In 2017 the D.C. Circuit upheld Sudan’s liability but vacated the punitive damages. The court ruled that the plaintiffs could not recover punitive damages under the 1976 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), because when Congress amended the statute to permit claims against state sponsors of terrorism, it did not expressly authorize recovery of punitive damages in lawsuits over conduct that predated the amendment.
The plaintiffs filed a cert. petition, which the Supreme Court granted today. The Court’s order limits review to the second issue raised in the petition: whether the FSIA applies retroactively, permitting punitive damages against foreign states for terrorist activities occurring prior to the passage of the current version of the act.
The decision in this case will obviously have an impact on the various other punitive damages cases involving state-sponsored terrorism, but it may not have much application outside that context.