California Punitives by Horvitz & Levy
  • Vohra v. Cadigan Arbor Park: Trial Court Properly Granted Motion to Strike Punitive Damages

    We don’t see many California appeals involving motions to strike punitive damages allegations on the ground that a complaint fails to allege clear and convincing evidence of malice, oppression or fraud. There have only been two such opinions since we started this blog over two years ago: one that affirmed a trial court order denying a motion to strike, and one that affirmed a trial court order granting a motion to strike.

    Here’s number three. In this unpublished opinion, the California Court of Appeal (Fourth Appellate District, Division Three) concludes that a trial court properly granted a motion to strike.

  • Neman v. Elyaszadeh: $1.3 Million in Punitive Damages Affirmed

    In this unpublished opinion, the California Court of Appeal (Second Appellate District, Division Five) affirms a punitive damages award of $1.3 million in an action for breach of contract and fraud arising out of a dispute between the co-owners of a real estate development corporation. The compensatory damages were nearly $13 million.

    The defendant argued on appeal that the punitive damages award was procedurally improper because the trial court conducted a bifurcated trial even though the defendant had not requested bifurcation. The Court of Appeal concluded that the defendant had waived the argument because at one point he had filed a trial brief requesting bifurcation.

  • McDonald’s Settles Case Involving Punitive Damages for Strip Search

    Last year we posted about a case in which McDonald’s was hit for punitive damages because a prank caller supposedly tricked a McDonald’s store manager into performing a strip search on a store employee. Actually, the manager asked her boyfriend, who was not even a store employer, to perform a body cavity search. He ended up sexually abusing the employee in the process.

    Amazingly, the Kentucky Court of Appeals ordered McDonald’s to pay $1 million in punitive damages to the manager who authorized the body cavity search, plus another $5 million to the victim of the strip search. The Courier-Journal of Louisville, Kentucky is now reporting that McDonald’s has settled the case for an undisclosed amount.

  • West Virginia Supreme Court Reduces $196.2 Million Punitive Damages Award to $98 Million

    The West Virginia Supreme Court has issued its opinion in a pollution/medical monitoring case involving a $400 million verdict against DuPont, including $196.2 million in punitive damages. The case had generated a lot of attention, not only because it was the fifth largest punitive damages award in the country in 2005, but also because the governor of West Virginia filed an amicus brief supporting DuPont’s petition for review to the West Virginia Supreme Court.

    The opinion remands the case for further proceedings to determine whether the this entire class action should be dismissed on punitive damages statute of limitations grounds. It also holds that, even if the plaintiffs’ claims are not barred the statute of limitations, the punitive damages should be reduced because (1) they were based in part on medical monitoring damages, which shouldn’t be used to calculate punitive damages because punitive damages can only be based on “actual harm,” and (2) DuPont should be credited for $20 million it already paid for cleanup expenses.

    Hat tip: West Virginia Citizens Against Lawsuit Abuse

    Related posts:

    West Virginia Supreme Court Agrees to Review $196.2 Million Punitive Damages Award Against Dupont

    W. Va. Supreme Court Candidates Support Appellate Review of Punitive Damages

    West Virginia Gov. Defends His Amicus Brief in Punitive Damages Case

    West Virginia Governor Draws Fire for Intervening in Punitive Damages Case

    Does West Virginia’s Lack of a Right to Appeal a Punitive Damages Award Violate Due Process?

    West Virginia Governor Files Amicus Brief Urging West Virginia Supreme Court to Review Punitive Damages Award Against DuPont

    DuPont Asks West Virginia Supreme Court to Review $196.2 Million Punitive Damages Award

  • A Curious Punitive Damages Opinion from Florida

    Florida has been making a lot of punitive damages news lately. In addition to the series of big punitive awards being handed out to smokers and their heirs, Florida’s intermediate appellate court issued an interesting (and in my mind, questionable) opinion this week in Lawnwood Medical Center v. Sadow.

    In Lawnwood, the jury awarded nominal tort damages against a hospital for slandering a doctor, and then added $5 million in punitive damages. The hospital appealed the award as excessive under the Florida law and the Due Process Clause of the federal constitution.

    The District Court of Appeal (Fourth District) analyzed the U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions in BMW v. Gore and State Farm v. Campbell, noted the ratio-based analysis in those cases, but suggested that those decisions might only apply to the specific types of misconduct involved, and not to cases involving malice. The court then suggested that cases involving malice are perhaps governed by the U.S. Supreme Court’s earlier decision in TXO v. Alliance, which the Florida court viewed as imposing no ratio limits on punitive damages imposed for malicious conduct.

    Obviously I am influenced by my perspective as a defense lawyer, but I think the court’s analysis is deeply flawed. Nothing in BMW and Campbell suggest that the Supreme Court’s three-guidepost test is inapplicable to cases involving malice. To the contrary, Campbell expressly contemplated that the test would be applied to cases involving malice. Campbell instructs lower courts to consider a variety of factors when analyzing the reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct (the first “guidepost”), including whether the defendant acted with malice. That wouldn’t make much sense if the whole analysis is inapplicable to malice cases. Campbell suggested that in some situations involving extreme reprehensibility and small compensatory damages, ratios in excess of single digits might be permissible. But the court did not suggest that ratio limitations are simply inapplicable in such cases. Such an exception would dramatically undermine the BMW/Campbell analysis, given that malice is perhaps the most frequent basis for imposing punitive damages under state law.

    Fortunately, the Florida court in Lawnwood stopped short of actually holding that BMW and Campbell are inapplicable to malice cases. Instead, the court certified the following question to the Florida Supreme Court:

    Are punitive damages of $5,000,000 arbitrary or excessive under the Federal Constitution where the jury awarded no compensation beyond presumed nominal damages but found that defendant intentionally and maliciously harmed plaintiff by slanders per se?

    Stay tuned to see what the Florida Supreme Court does with this issue.

    Hat tip: Florida Legal Blog

  • Amerigraphics v. Mercury: $1.7 Million Punitive Damages Award Reduced to $500,000

    In this published opinion, the California Court of Appeal (Second Appellate District, Division Two) holds that a punitive damages award of $1.7 million is excessive and must be reduced to $500,000.

    The jury in this insurance bad faith case originally awarded $170,000 in compensatory damages, plus $3 million in punitive damages, for a 17.6-to-1 ratio. After the verdict, the trial court awarded $346,541.25 in attorney’s fees as additional damages under Brandt v. Superior Court (1985) 37 Cal.3d 813. The trial court also concluded, however, that the jury’s punitive damages award was excessive and should be reduced to $1.7 million, ten times the jury’s compensatory damages award.

    The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court’s reduced award was still excessive. First, the court noted that the defendant’s conduct, which involved no physical harm or disregard for health and safety, implicated only one of the five “reprehensibility factors” identified by the U.S. Supreme Court in State Farm v. Campbell. The court held that the defendant could not be treated as a repeat offender merely because its conduct in this case involved a course of dealing with the plaintiff, rather than a single isolated incident; the court observed that the case involved only one insured and one claim, without any evidence that the defendant had engaged in similar conduct towards other insureds in the past.

    Next, the court addressed the ratio of the punitive damages award to the compensatory damages award, and concluded that the defendant’s conduct could not support a 10-to-1 ratio. The court rejected the plaintiff’s invitation to add the trial court’s Brandt fee award to the jury’s compensatory damages award, which would yield a 3.2-to-1 ratio. The court said that the Brandt fees could not be considered for ratio purposes because they were awarded after the jury’s verdict.

    Having concluded that a 10-to-1 ratio was too high, the court then turned to the question of what the maximum ratio should be. Although the court discussed the U.S. Supreme Court’s Exxon Shipping opinion and other recent decisions imposing a 1-to-1 ratio (including the California Supreme Court’s recent decision in Roby v. McKesson), the court ultimately decided upon a 3.8-to-1 ratio, which results in an award of $500,000. The court picked that figure not just because it’s a nice round number, but because defense counsel had suggested during closing argument that the jury could award as much as $500,000. The court didn’t assign any evidentiary value to counsel’s argument, and did not find estoppel based on that argument, but the court said it independently agreed that $500,000 was the appropriate ceiling.

    Full disclosure: Horvitz & Levy LLP represented the defendant on appeal.

  • Pennsylvania Jury Awards $95 Million in Punitive Damages Against Mass Murderer

    According to this press release on New York Injury News, a jury in Pennsylvania has awarded $95 million in punitive damages against a former nurse who admitted to killing 29 people and attempting to kill six more by administering lethal doses of drugs. It would be awfully difficult to argue against a big punitive damages award in a case like that. Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, the defendant has no assets, so they’re not likely to see a penny of this award. Unless, of course, the defendant writes a book about his experiences, but a killer would never do something like that, right?

  • Survey Ranks California’s Litigation Climate Among Worst in the Nation, Again.

    We’re 46th! According to this survey conducted by the US Chamber of Commerce’s Institute for Litigation Reform, California’s litigation climate ranks 46th in the nation in the eyes of corporate counsel and executives. That’s down from 44th in 2008, the last time the survey was conducted. The same survey lists Los Angeles County as the second worst venue in the nation. Unlike the 2008 survey, this year’s survey does not include a separate ranking for each state on the issue of punitive damages.

    Hat tip: CJAC

  • Gellerman v. Aldrich: Another Reversal for Failure to Present Financial Condition Evidence

    Regular readers of this blog are well aware that California appellate courts frequently reverse punitive damages awards if the plaintiff failed to introduce meaningful evidence of the defendant’s financial condition. In this unpublished opinion, the Sixth Appellate District reverses another judgment on that basis, with a bit of a twist.

    The trial court made a highly unorthodox damages award after a bench trial; the court awarded a lump sum amount of damages, without differentiating between compensatory damages and punitive damages. The Court of Appeal criticizes that practice, and then goes on to point out flaws in both the compensatory and punitive elements of the undifferentiated award.

    First, the court concludes that the trial court used the wrong measure of compensatory damages. Then the court concludes that the trial court should have decided whether the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence of the defendant’s financial condition to permit an award of punitive damages. The trial court had expressed doubt about the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s evidence, but never actually decided the issue. The plaintiff tried to argue on appeal that California law does not require plaintiffs to introduce financial condition evidence, but the Court of Appeal summarily rejected that contention as a misreading of the law. So the case goes back to the trial court to make evaluate the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s evidence. (And consistent with California law, the plaintiff should not be permitted to introduce new financial condidtion evidence on remand – – see Kelly v. Haag (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 910, 914.)