California Punitives by Horvitz & Levy
  • Jurinko v. Medical Protective Company: Third Circuit Reduces Punitive Damages Award, Adopts 1-to-1 Ratio

    Just when we thought there would be no more punitive damages news this year, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit issued this published non-precedential opinion today.

    The jury in this insurance bad faith case awarded $1.66 million in compensatory damages and $6.25 million in punitive damages, for a roughly four-to-one ratio (more like a three-to-one ratio if you include attorney’s fees and costs as part of the compensatory damages award, which the Third Circuit did). The Third Circuit rejected the defendant’s argument that punitive damages were not warranted in this case, but agreed that the amount of the punitive award was excessive under the three BMW v. Gore “guideposts” (reprehensibility, ratio, and comparable penalties).

    First, the court observed that the defendant’s conduct implicated only two of the five “reprehensibility factors” identified in State Farm v. Campbell. The plaintiff had argued that a third factor – recidivism – was also present, based on the fact that the defendant’s wrongful behavior consisted of a course of conduct, rather than a single act. The Third Circuit, citing the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Justin Combs Publ’g (6th Cir. 2007) (“The repeated conduct factor requires that the similar reprehensible conduct be committed against various different parties rather than repeated reprehensible acts within the single transaction with the plaintiff”), discounted the recidivism factor because there was no evidence that the defendant insurer had previously engaged in similar misconduct towards other policyholders.

    Second, the court concluded that the ratio awarded by the jury was excessive in light of the substantial compensatory damages. The court cited Campbell‘s statement that the ratio should be low, perhaps only one-to-one, in cases involving substantial punitive damages. The court also cited a number of other federal cases that have recently implemented that statement and adopted one-to-one ratios. The court also referred to the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Exxon Shipping, which although it did not directly address constitutional limits on punitive damages, did reiterate that 1-to-1 ratios are appropriate in cases involving substantial compensatory damages.

    Third, the court compared the punitive damages award to penalties authorized by statute for similar misconduct. Because this was a diversity case, the court looked to Pennsylvania law, which provides a $5,000 penalty for unfair practices by insurers. The court noted that the jury’s punitive damages award was 1250 times higher than the comparable statutory penalty. Accordingly, the third guidepost also weighed in favor of a reduction of the award.

    The court’s adoption of a one-to-one ratio in this case follows a trend we have observed in California and elsewhere. After the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Campbell in 2004, very few courts followed the Supreme Court’s statement that one-to-one ratios are appropriate in cases with substantial punitive damages. But in the past two years, even before the Exxon Shipping decision, many courts have begun to follow Campbell and reduce punitive damages down to one-to-one ratios, even in cases like this where the ratio was already in the single-digit range.

    Hat tip: The Legal Intelligencer (via Law.com).

    [UPDATE: I originally described this as a “published” opinion, but a reader pointed out to me that the opinion is designed as non-precedential. In other words, it’s the sort of opinion that would have been unpublished and unciteable prior to the enactment of FRAP 32.1. Technically it is “published” in the sense that all federal appellate decisions are publicly available and citeable now, but I should have noted in my original post that the opinion is designated as non-precedential, so I have made a correction above.]

  • Law Review Article Discusses Punitive Damages Case Pending Before U.S. Supreme Court

    Things have been pretty quiet on the punitive damages front lately, leaving us no significant case developments to discuss for almost two weeks. But for those of you who are just dying for one last fix of punitive-damages-related analysis before the end of the year, you might want to check out this article in the latest edition of the University of San Francisco Maritime Law Journal: “A Beacon for the Protection of Seamen: the Eleventh Circuit Permits Punitive Damages for the Willful Withholding of Maintenance and Cure in Atlantic Sounding Co. v. Townsend.”

    I don’t have an online link for the article, but you can find it on Westlaw using the citation 20 USFMLJ 237. The article, written by Joshua Hanbury, a third-year law student at the University of Richmond School of Law, provides an in depth discussion of the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Atlantic Sounding Co. The article was written before the U.S. Supreme Court granted cert. in that case, but this article seems to include more information about the issues than anything I’ve seen even since cert. was granted. For some strange reason, the availability of punitive damages for maintenance and cure violations has not captured the public imagination. Go figure.

    As previously noted, Atlantic Sounding Co. is set for oral argument on March 2.

  • Kim v. Weston: Unpublished Opinion Reverses Punitive Damages Award

    Stop me if you’ve heard this before, but the California Court of Appeal has reversed a punitive damages award because the plaintiff failed to present sufficient evidence of the defendant’s financial condition. That makes at least four such reversals this year alone, arising from California’s unique rule that plaintiffs must present meaningful evidence of the defendant’s financial condition in order to obtain punitive damages. This rule has been part of California law since 1991, but it’s amazing how many lawyers seem to be unfamiliar with it.

    In this case, the plaintiff presented evidence that the defendant owned several rental properties, but that evidence was insufficient to create a complete picture of the defendant’s financial condition because plaintiff failed to provide evidence regarding the profitability of the properties or any encumbrances on the property. Since the plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to present all her evidence at trial, she was not entitled to a retrial on the issue of punitive damages. The court directed entry of judgment for the defendant on the punitive damages claim.

  • Vermont Jury Awards $3.4 Million in Punitive Damages in Priest Abuse Case

    The Barre Montpelier Times Argus is reporting that a jury was awarded $192,500 in compensatory damages and $3.4 million in punitive damages to a plaintiff who was molested by a priest in 1977, when the plaintiff was an 11-year-old altar boy. That’s a ratio of nearly 18-to-1. If ever there were a case in which the extremely despicable nature of the conduct justifies a ratio beyond the single-digit range, this appears to be it. This is the second major punitive damages award of the year against the Roman Catholic Diocese of Vermont, which is appealing a $8.7 million verdict awarded in May. The same priest was involved in both cases, and is involved in 19 more pending cases. According to the Argus story, the diocese has dismissed the priest from the diocese but has not stripped him of his priesthood.

  • Findlaw Column: Anthony Sebok Analyzes Williams III Oral Argument

    In his Findlaw column, Professor Anthony Sebok summarizes the history of the Philip Morris v. Williams litigation and offers some cautious predictions about the likely result of that case’s third trip to the U.S. Supreme Court. Prof. Sebok seems to think it’s a close call, but an affirmance is the most likely outcome. His prediction differs from my guess that a 5-4 reversal is more likely.

    Prof. Sebok’s prediction seems to be based on his observation that Justice Breyer, who wrote the opinion in favor of Philip Morris in Williams II, now seems to be leaning towards the plaintiff. I agree that Justice Breyer’s seems inclined to affirm, but I don’t think that necessarily means the plaintiff will win. In my view, Justice Scalia, who dissented from Justice Breyer’s opinion in Williams II, now seems to be clearly leaning towards reversal. If Justices Breyer and Scalia switch sides and everything else stays the same, Philip Morris will prevail again. (Although I’m not as certain about this, I think some of the others, particularly Justices Souter and Thomas, may end up switching sides as well.)

  • New York High Court Reverses $17.1 Million Punitive Damages Award Against Tobacco Companies

    The New York State Court of Appeals issued an opinion today reversing a $20.5 million judgment against Brown & Williamson and Philip Morris. The judgment included $17.1 in punitive damages.

    The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants’ cigarettes were defectively designed because they should have contained lower levels of tar and nicotine. The Court of Appeals found that the plaintiffs failed to prove an element of their case:

    We agree with the Appellate Division that plaintiffs failed to prove an essential element of their case: that regular cigarettes and “light” cigarettes have the same “utility.” The only “utility” of a cigarette is to gratify smokers’ desires for a certain experience, and plaintiffs did not prove, or try to prove, that light cigarettes perform this function as well as regular cigarettes.

    This opinion comes on the heels of a decision earlier today reversing a $20 million punitive damages award against Brown & Williamson in Missouri.

  • Missouri Court of Appeals Reverses $20 Million Punitive Damages Award Against Tobacco Company

    The Kansas City Business Journal reports that the Missouri Court of Appeals has reversed a $20 million punitive damages award against Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. Click here to view the opinion. The plaintiffs, family members of a deceased smoker, brought a wrongful death action under Missouri law and obtained a jury award of $500,000 in compensatory damages and $20 million in punitive damages, a ratio of 40 to 1. The Court of Appeal reversed, ordering a new trial on punitive damages, on the ground that only one of the plaintiffs’ three liability theories was supported by substantial evidence. (Note: in California, punitive damages are not permitted at all in wrongful death actions.)

    This case comes on the heels of yesterday’s much less favorable decision for the tobacco industry in Altria Group Inc. v. Good, in which the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that federal law does not preempt suits by smokers who claimed they were mislead about the dangers of “light” cigarettes. As reported by Bloomberg, the ruling paves the way for smokers in various states to proceed with lawsuits seeking punitive damages.

  • Florida Bar Journal Article: Why Punitive Damages and Criminal Sentences Are Reviewed Differently

    The December 2008 edition of the Florida Bar Journal contains an article entitled “Why Punitive Damages and Criminal Sentences Are Reviewed Differently and What It Means to Your Appeal.” The article is written by Jonathan D. Colan, an assistant U.S. attorney in the Appellate Division of the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Southern District of Florida and an adjunct professor of issues in appellate law at the University of Miami School of Law. I could not find any online link for the article, but it can be found on Westlaw at 82-DEC FLBJ 30.

    For those who are interested in further comparisons between punitive damages and criminal law, you might want to check out Professor Chris Green‘s article “Punishing Corporations: The Food Chain Schizophrenia in Punitive Damages and Criminal Law.” Prof. Green was a commenter at this site before we decided to disable the comments feature so we wouldn’t have to moderate all the crackpot comments (not from Prof. Green, of course, whose comments were always thoughtful and on point).

  • Exxon Shipping: Potential Impacts are Well Beyond Maritime Law

    William E. Thomson and Kahn A. Scolnick recently published an article entitled “The Supreme Court Sets New Damage Limits Under Federal Common Law” in the October 2008 issue of the Federalist Society’s publication, Class Action Watch. The authors make the claim that while the case arose under federal martime law, “the decision is important in several respects that may have application far beyond that narrow context.” In particular, the authors contend “there is little principled basis for refusing to extend Baker’s1:1 ratio to other areas of federal common law.” As one example, the authors point to federal civil rights cases where the 1:1 ratio might be applied. The authors also speculate that the rationale for the 1:1 ratio would also apply equally in due process challenges to punitive damage awards in light of State Farm’s statement that in cases with “substantial” compensatory damages, a 1:1 ratio “can reach the outermost limit of the due process guarantee.”

  • English Tribunal Awards First Ever Punitive Damage Award

    This news is a few weeks old, but of interest to anyone who follows punitive damages. As reported by the Daily Express, “A lesbian soldier was awarded £186,000 compensation yesterday after she was sexually harassed by a male sergeant who then tried to wreck her career. . . . The payout included £50,000 in exemplary damages, £20,000 in aggravated damages and £30,000 for hurt feelings.” The paper reports that this is the first time an English employment tribunal has awarded exemplary damages.

    Update: This article indicates an appeal has been filed challenging the award. [1/8/09 – LP]