California Punitives by Horvitz & Levy
  • Does West Virginia’s Lack of a Right to Appeal a Punitive Damages Award Violate Due Process?

    West Virginia is one of three states that does not afford litigants an automatic right to file an appeal. Rather, under Rule 3 of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate Procedure, the losing party must first petition the Supreme Court for permission to appeal. A full appeal only follows if the court permits it.

    The United States Supreme Court has held that defendants’ federal due process rights are violated by certain punitive damage awards. Can a state procedural rule preclude review for such federal due process violations? In 2003, the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari in Mountain Enterprises, Inc. v. Fitch et al., No. 03-1223 (U.S. Sup. Ct.), a challenge to the West Virginia Supreme Court’s refusal to hear an appeal from a punitive damage award. This may not be the final word. We previously blogged here about the West Virginia Supreme Court’s refusal to hear the appeal from a $270 million punitive damage award entered against NiSource. As reported in the PR Newswire, NiSource has now indicated it plans to file a petition for writ of certiorari raising again the issue that the refusal to be permitted to appeal from a punitive damage award is itself a violation of due process. NiSource could rely on Honda Motor Company v. Oberg, in which the Supreme Court held that Oregon’s denial of review of the size of punitive damages awards violates the Due Process Clause.

  • West Virginia Governor Files Amicus Brief Urging West Virginia Supreme Court to Review Punitive Damages Award Against DuPont

    Newsvine.com is reporting that Joe Manchin, the governor of West Virginia, has filed an amicus brief in the West Virginia Supreme Court supporting DuPont’s petition for review in a case involving a $196.2 million punitive damages award.

    The lead plaintiffs’ lawyer, Michael Papantonio, is calling the Gov. Manchin’s action unprecedented. I have to admit, I’ve never heard of a sitting governor asking his own state’s supreme court to take up a particular case.

    Papatonio is probably overstating his case a bit, however, when he says that Gov. Manchin’s action shows how much the deck is stacked against the little guys in West Virginia who are trying to take on corporate America. Perhaps Papantanio, a Florida lawyer, is unaware of the history of punitive damages litigation in West Virginia. This is the state that brought us the TXO case ($19,000 in compensatory damages and $10 million in punitive damages), the state whose litigation climate is consistently ranked last or second-to-last in surveys of corporate counsel, the state that leads the nation in high jury verdicts and punitive damages awards, the state whose Supreme Court recently declined to even review a case involving a $270 million punitive damages award, and the state that recently allowed a reverse-bifurcation procedure in two separate cases, under which a jury will decide punitive damages before even deciding liability or compensatory damages. If anything, the deck seems stacked in favor of plaintiffs’ lawyers, not against them.

  • Anthony Sebok Findlaw Essay: “The Lessons of the Supreme Court’s Recent Decision Granting a Huge Victory to Exxon in the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Case”

    Findlaw.com features this essay by Anthony Sebok, a law professor at the Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law.

    In light of Sebok’s prior writings, it is not surprising that he finds fault with the Court’s adoption of a one-to-one ratio in Exxon Shipping Co. Unlike the dissenters in that case, however, Sebok does not criticize the majority for improperly delving into substantively law. He views the majority opinion as an appropriate exercise of common law rulemaking; he just thinks the opinion’s reasoning is misguided because it rests on a misunderstanding of the historical purpose of punitive damages.

    Sebok concludes by making one of the same observations that we made about the Exxon Shipping Co. decision: that the unusual circumstances of this case yielded a five-justice voting alignment that’s not likely to be repeated if the Supreme Court takes on another punitive damages case.

  • Mississippi Judge Rejects Punitive Damages Claim in Closely Watched Hurricane Katrina Lawsuit Against USAA

    Last week a jury awarded $910,000 to a Mississippi couple suing USAA for wrongfully denying their claim for damage to their home caused by Hurricane Katrina. According to the SunHerald’s coverage of the case, USAA took the position that the damage was caused by water, which was not covered the the insured’s policy. The insureds claimed the damage was caused by wind, which was covered. Describing the impact of the case on other Katrina-related insurance disputes, the plaintiffs’ attorney announced, “It’s going to help plaintiffs everywhere.”

    The judge, however, has now dismissed the plaintiffs’ punitive damages claim, prompting the plaintiffs to file an emergency motion to hold the jury until the plaintiffs can seek appellate review.

    A blog called “Slabbed” has a nice collection of links to the media coverage on this case.

  • ALI-ABA Will Hold July 17 Webcast on Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker

    On Thursday July 17th from noon to 1 pm. EST, ALI-ABA is presenting a webcast/telephone seminar entitled Exxon: The Supreme Court Rules on Preemption and Punitive Damages. The panelists will include Andy Frey of Mayer Brown (who argued BMW v. Gore and Philip Morris v. Wililams and filed an amicus brief in Exxon Valdez), University of Minnesota Law Professor Alexandra Klass, and UNLV Law Professor Jeffrey Stempel.

    Hat tip: TortsProf Blog.

  • Honda Canada v. Keays: Supreme Court of Canada Vacates $500,000 Punitive Damages Award

    The Supreme Court of Canada issued an opinion today striking down a $500,000 punitive damages award in a wrongful-dismissal lawsuit. By a vote of 7-2, the court said Honda’s conduct “was not sufficiently egregious or outrageous to warrant an award of punitive damages.”

    As we noted in an earlier post about this case, the punitive damages award was considered large by Canadian standards, and was the largest punitive damages award ever in a Canadian employment-law case.

  • Coverage and Commentary on Exxon Valdez Decision

    Every major news outlet and countless bloggers have now weighed in on the Supreme Court’s opinion yesterday in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker. Howard Bashman has a nice collection of the mainstream media links.

    In addition to those stories, here are a couple of opinion pieces with diametrically opposite responses to the opinion. Greg Palast writes about the $500 million in punitive damages: “It’s so cheap, it’s like a permit to spill.” On the other side of the spectrum, the U.S. Chamber hails the decision in a blog post entitled “Towards Predictability and Common Sense.”

    In a couple of odd footnotes to this saga:

    A Wall Street Journal article on the Exxon Shipping Co. opinion mentions that after the accident, the Exxon Valdez continued to sail the seas as a single-hulled Exxon oil tanker, ferrying crude outside of the U.S., until earlier this year when it was sold to a Hong Kong company, which converted it to carry bulk ore. It is now known as the Dong Fang Ocean.

    And Newsday.com has a story about the current whereabouts of the infamous Captain Joseph Hazelwood, whose drunken encounter with a reef off Bligh Island twenty years ago caused this whole mess. The reporter asked Captain Hazelwood to comment on the Supreme Court’s opinion and he said he had “no reaction.”

  • If Supreme Court Justices Were Required to Put Their Stock Holdings in Blind Trusts, Exxon Might Have Saved $500 Million

    David A. Ridenour has written a Christian Science Monitor editorial entitled “Blind Trusts Will Improve Blind Justice in the High Court.” Ridenour contends that the president and the senate should require Supreme Court nominees to place their assets in a blind trust as a condition of serving, to avoid recusals due to a financial conflict of interest.

    Ridenour’s article is particularly timely, coming out on the same day as the decision in Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker. In that case, Justice Alito recused himself because he owns stock in Exxon Mobil. As a result, the Court split 4-4 and could not reach a decision about Exxon’s argument that, under maritime law, punitive damages cannot be imposed on a ship owner based on the acts of a ship captain. Because the Court couldn’t reach a decision, the Ninth Circuit’s decision on that issue was affirmed.

    There’s a good chance Justice Alito would have adopted Exxon’s argument on that issue if he had not recused himself. If so, his recusal cost Exxon $500 million. But Exxon saved $2 billion even without Justice Alito’s participation, so they probably won’t be complaining.

  • Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker Illustrates The Supreme Court’s Increasing Frustration with “Eccentrically High” Punitive Damages

    Today’s decision in the Exxon Valdez case (Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker) will undoubtedly launch a thousand law review articles over the next few months and years. It will be interesting to see if any consensus develops in the legal academic community about the likely future developments that will flow from this opinion, but in the meantime, here are my initial thoughts.

    Taken in isolation, this opinion could be dismissed as a maritime law decision with little impact beyond federal common law. Technically, the opinion won’t be binding authority with respect to punitive damages awards arising under state law. But viewed in the context of the Supreme Court’s recent line of punitive damages decisions, the opinion seems to be a lot more important than that.

    When the Supreme Court ventured into the area of punitive damages in cases like Oberg, Haslip, and TXO, members of the Court expressed some concern about unlimited punitive damages awards, but they declined to impose any limits, focusing instead on procedural safeguards. A few years later, however, in BMW v. Gore, the Court seemed to arrive at the view that procedural safeguards were not enough and substantive limits were needed. But the Court adopted a flexible multi-factor balancing test instead of imposing any concrete limits. When that didn’t seem to work, the Court revisited the issue again in State Farm v. Campbell. While Campbell stopped short of imposing absolute bright-line limits, the Court limited the flexibility of its prior guidelines, holding that most awards should be less than ten times the amount of compensatory damages, and perhaps only equal to compensatory damages in cases where the compensatory damages themselves are “substantial.”

    Most recently, in last year’s Philip Morris v. Williams decision, the Supreme Court returned again to a procedural issue and declined to address the issue of ratios. Some commentators opined that Williams indicated a shift away from the idea of ratios and substantive limits. (See for example, Anthony Sebok, “After Philip Morris v. Williams: What Is Left of the Single Digit Ratio.”) Today’s opinion seems to clearly refute that notion. Single digits are back, with a vengeance.

    Because Exxon Shipping arose under maritime law and not state law, the Court felt even less constrained about imposing substantive limits, and opted for the the simplest possible test: a bright-line limit that punitive damages cannot exceed the amount of compensatory damages. Justice Souter, writing for the majority, adopted this ratio out of concern for the “stark unpredictability” of punitive damages and the unfairness that arises from outlier awards. Clearly, the Court did not think these fairness problems were sufficiently ameliorated by their prior decisions, so they abandoned the idea of a flexible multi-factor test in favor of a rigid bright-line rule. Moreover, they did not draw the line at 3:1 or 4:1, benchmarks mentioned in the Court’s prior opinions. Instead, they adopted the 1:1 line based on data indicating that the median ratio overall for punitive damages is below that line. I cannot help but conclude that the Court has simply grown frustrated with the more subtle approach of its prior decisions and felt that drastic action was necessary.

    In response to the view of the dissenting Justices that the Court’s adoption of a substantive limit usurps Congress’s lawmaking function, Justice Souter noted that outlier punitive damages award are a judicially created problem and therefore should be addressed by the judiciary. All of this suggests that the Court may ultimately decide to tighten the screws even further if and when it reviews another punitive damages award under the Due Process Clause.

    (UPDATE on 6/26/08: Upon further reflection, it might prove difficult for Justice Souter to garner enough votes to adopt a stricter ratio analysis as a matter of due process. Justices Scalia and Thomas, who joined the majority in Exxon Shipping Co., have consistently rejected the Court’s use of the Due Process Clause to impose restrictions on the amount of punitive damages. Even if Justice Alito (who recused himself from Exxon Shipping Co.) agreed to adopt a more rigid ratio analysis in due process cases, Justice Souter would still need to get a vote from either Justice Stevens (who wrote BMW v. Gore and concurred in State Farm v. Cambpell but dissented from Exxon Shipping Co.) or Justice Breyer (who concurred in BMW and State Farm but dissented from Exxon Shipping Co.))

    Although Exxon Shipping Co. won’t be binding authority in many cases, many lower courts are likely to find it persuasive. The reasoning behind the Supreme Court’s adoption of the 1:1 limit is not based on any peculiarities of maritime law. It is based on fairness concerns arising from the wild unpredictability of outlier punitive damages awards, an issue that is obviously not limited to maritime cases.

  • The Exxon Valdez Decision: “A Warning About Litigant-Funded Research in Supreme Court Cases”

    Professor Rick Hasen at Election Law Blog has posted an interesting comment on this footnote (fn. 17) in the Exxon Valdez (Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker) opinion:

    The Court is aware of a body of literature running parallel to anecdotal reports, examining the predictability of punitive awards by conducting numerous “mock juries,” where different “jurors” are confronted with the same hypothetical case. See, e.g., C. Sunstein, R. Hastie, J. Payne, D. Schkade, W. Viscusi, Punitive Damages: How Juries Decide (2002); Schkade, Sunstein, & Kahneman, Deliberating About Dollars: The Severity Shift, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 1139 2000); Hastie, Schkade, & Payne, Juror Judgments in Civil Cases: Effects of Plaintiff’s Requests and Plaintiff’s Identity in Punitive Damage Awards, 23 Law & Hum. Behav. 445 (1999); Sunstein, Kahneman, & Schkade, Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 Yale L. J. 2071 (1998). Because this research was funded in part by Exxon, we decline to rely on it.

    (Emphasis added.)

    Here’s Rick’s comment:

    Now I used to keep up with the psychological literature more than I do now, but I remain somewhat familiar with this work and very familiar with the work of some of the authors cited above. It is really top notch work. So I find this footnote troubling. There will be cases (including election law cases) in which there are no extant studies on an empirical question at the heart of a case. At that point, it makes sense for litigants to fund such research. Indeed, when such research appears in an expert report subject to cross-examination, I assume the Court has no problem relying upon the evidence. So why should it be different when a litigant funds the research, particularly if the research has gone through peer review and of course if the funding source is disclosed so that the opposing side may probe for bias?

    Rick’s point makes a lot of sense to me (and not just because he’s affiliated with our firm).