California Punitives by Horvitz & Levy
  • Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker Illustrates The Supreme Court’s Increasing Frustration with “Eccentrically High” Punitive Damages

    Today’s decision in the Exxon Valdez case (Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker) will undoubtedly launch a thousand law review articles over the next few months and years. It will be interesting to see if any consensus develops in the legal academic community about the likely future developments that will flow from this opinion, but in the meantime, here are my initial thoughts.

    Taken in isolation, this opinion could be dismissed as a maritime law decision with little impact beyond federal common law. Technically, the opinion won’t be binding authority with respect to punitive damages awards arising under state law. But viewed in the context of the Supreme Court’s recent line of punitive damages decisions, the opinion seems to be a lot more important than that.

    When the Supreme Court ventured into the area of punitive damages in cases like Oberg, Haslip, and TXO, members of the Court expressed some concern about unlimited punitive damages awards, but they declined to impose any limits, focusing instead on procedural safeguards. A few years later, however, in BMW v. Gore, the Court seemed to arrive at the view that procedural safeguards were not enough and substantive limits were needed. But the Court adopted a flexible multi-factor balancing test instead of imposing any concrete limits. When that didn’t seem to work, the Court revisited the issue again in State Farm v. Campbell. While Campbell stopped short of imposing absolute bright-line limits, the Court limited the flexibility of its prior guidelines, holding that most awards should be less than ten times the amount of compensatory damages, and perhaps only equal to compensatory damages in cases where the compensatory damages themselves are “substantial.”

    Most recently, in last year’s Philip Morris v. Williams decision, the Supreme Court returned again to a procedural issue and declined to address the issue of ratios. Some commentators opined that Williams indicated a shift away from the idea of ratios and substantive limits. (See for example, Anthony Sebok, “After Philip Morris v. Williams: What Is Left of the Single Digit Ratio.”) Today’s opinion seems to clearly refute that notion. Single digits are back, with a vengeance.

    Because Exxon Shipping arose under maritime law and not state law, the Court felt even less constrained about imposing substantive limits, and opted for the the simplest possible test: a bright-line limit that punitive damages cannot exceed the amount of compensatory damages. Justice Souter, writing for the majority, adopted this ratio out of concern for the “stark unpredictability” of punitive damages and the unfairness that arises from outlier awards. Clearly, the Court did not think these fairness problems were sufficiently ameliorated by their prior decisions, so they abandoned the idea of a flexible multi-factor test in favor of a rigid bright-line rule. Moreover, they did not draw the line at 3:1 or 4:1, benchmarks mentioned in the Court’s prior opinions. Instead, they adopted the 1:1 line based on data indicating that the median ratio overall for punitive damages is below that line. I cannot help but conclude that the Court has simply grown frustrated with the more subtle approach of its prior decisions and felt that drastic action was necessary.

    In response to the view of the dissenting Justices that the Court’s adoption of a substantive limit usurps Congress’s lawmaking function, Justice Souter noted that outlier punitive damages award are a judicially created problem and therefore should be addressed by the judiciary. All of this suggests that the Court may ultimately decide to tighten the screws even further if and when it reviews another punitive damages award under the Due Process Clause.

    (UPDATE on 6/26/08: Upon further reflection, it might prove difficult for Justice Souter to garner enough votes to adopt a stricter ratio analysis as a matter of due process. Justices Scalia and Thomas, who joined the majority in Exxon Shipping Co., have consistently rejected the Court’s use of the Due Process Clause to impose restrictions on the amount of punitive damages. Even if Justice Alito (who recused himself from Exxon Shipping Co.) agreed to adopt a more rigid ratio analysis in due process cases, Justice Souter would still need to get a vote from either Justice Stevens (who wrote BMW v. Gore and concurred in State Farm v. Cambpell but dissented from Exxon Shipping Co.) or Justice Breyer (who concurred in BMW and State Farm but dissented from Exxon Shipping Co.))

    Although Exxon Shipping Co. won’t be binding authority in many cases, many lower courts are likely to find it persuasive. The reasoning behind the Supreme Court’s adoption of the 1:1 limit is not based on any peculiarities of maritime law. It is based on fairness concerns arising from the wild unpredictability of outlier punitive damages awards, an issue that is obviously not limited to maritime cases.

  • The Exxon Valdez Decision: “A Warning About Litigant-Funded Research in Supreme Court Cases”

    Professor Rick Hasen at Election Law Blog has posted an interesting comment on this footnote (fn. 17) in the Exxon Valdez (Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker) opinion:

    The Court is aware of a body of literature running parallel to anecdotal reports, examining the predictability of punitive awards by conducting numerous “mock juries,” where different “jurors” are confronted with the same hypothetical case. See, e.g., C. Sunstein, R. Hastie, J. Payne, D. Schkade, W. Viscusi, Punitive Damages: How Juries Decide (2002); Schkade, Sunstein, & Kahneman, Deliberating About Dollars: The Severity Shift, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 1139 2000); Hastie, Schkade, & Payne, Juror Judgments in Civil Cases: Effects of Plaintiff’s Requests and Plaintiff’s Identity in Punitive Damage Awards, 23 Law & Hum. Behav. 445 (1999); Sunstein, Kahneman, & Schkade, Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law), 107 Yale L. J. 2071 (1998). Because this research was funded in part by Exxon, we decline to rely on it.

    (Emphasis added.)

    Here’s Rick’s comment:

    Now I used to keep up with the psychological literature more than I do now, but I remain somewhat familiar with this work and very familiar with the work of some of the authors cited above. It is really top notch work. So I find this footnote troubling. There will be cases (including election law cases) in which there are no extant studies on an empirical question at the heart of a case. At that point, it makes sense for litigants to fund such research. Indeed, when such research appears in an expert report subject to cross-examination, I assume the Court has no problem relying upon the evidence. So why should it be different when a litigant funds the research, particularly if the research has gone through peer review and of course if the funding source is disclosed so that the opposing side may probe for bias?

    Rick’s point makes a lot of sense to me (and not just because he’s affiliated with our firm).

  • Supreme Court Reduces Exxon Valdez Punitive Damages Award


    The U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in the Exxon Valdez punitive damages litigation (Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker) this morning. As we predicted, the Court reduced the award but rejected Exxon’s request to throw out the punitive damages altogether. The Court was split 4-4 (because Justice Alito recused himself) regarding Exxon’s argument that the actions of a ship captain cannot, as a matter of law, expose the ship owner to punitive damages. And the Court rejected Exxon’s argument that the Clean Water Act prohibits the imposition of punitive damages.

    But the Court agreed with Exxon that the award is excessive. The Court based its excessiveness analysis not on the Due Process Clause (as in the BMW v. Gore and State Farm v. Campbell cases), but on principles of federal common law. After fleshing out those principles, the Court reduced the award down to $507.5 million, equal to the amount of compensatory damages as determined by the district court. This may finally bring this case to a close, twenty years after the spill and fourteen years after the verdict.

    We will have further commentary on this opinion once we’ve had a little more time to digest it.

  • More Punitive Damages Humor

    Before we launched this blog, I wouldn’t have thought that the topic of punitive damages had a lot of humor potential. But in the past six months we’ve stumbled across a few instances of punitive-damages-related humor, including this cartoon and this set of dinner plates commemorating notable punitive damages cases. (At least I hope those were supposed to be funny.) And now, to add to the collection, is this Jerky Boys prank phone call posted on YouTube. Those of you familiar with the Jerky Boys may be wondering if this is safe for work. Surprisingly, it is.

  • DuPont Asks West Virginia Supreme Court to Review $196.2 Million Punitive Damages Award

    DuPont has issued a press release announcing that they have petitioned the West Virginia Supreme Court to review a class-action pollution case with a $251 million judgment, including $196.2 million in punitive damages. According to this story from the West Virginia Record, the verdict in this case was the fifth largest verdict in the nation in 2007.

  • No Opinion Yet In Exxon Valdez Punitive Damages Case; Ruling Could Come on Wednesday

    This morning, the U.S. Supreme Court issued opinions in three of its ten undecided cases from this term, but the Court still hasn’t ruled on the Exxon Valdez punitive damages case (Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker).

    The Court has seven undecided cases remaining from this term. Wednesday is the next day on which the Court will issue opinions. Because the Court is not likely to issue all seven opinions on Wednesday, there will probably be at least one more opinion day after that.

    Hat tip: SCOTUSblog.

  • California Supreme Court Extends Time to Rule on Petition for Review in Buell-Wilson

    The California Supreme Court issued an order today granting itself an extension of time to rule on the petition for review in Buell-Wilson v. Ford Motor Co. (See the court’s online docket.) The new deadline for a ruling is July 25, but the court is likely to rule well before the 25th. As readers of this blog will recall, the court did the same thing last week in another punitive damages case, Holdgrafer v. Unocal, and then the court ruled on the petition this week.

  • Directorship Magazine Ranks State Litigation Climates: California Ranked 46th

    Directorship Magazine has released its annual “State Litigation Guide,” which it describes as “The annual boardroom guide to the litigation climates in all 50 states.” Among other things, the guide focuses on each state’s propensity for imposing large amounts of punitive damages.

    According to the survey, the 10 best states are:

    1. Tennessee
    2. Utah
    3. Indiana
    4. Ohio
    5. North Dakota
    6. North Carolina
    7. Nebraska
    8. Virginia
    9. Michigan
    10. South Dakota

    The 10 worst states are:

    1. Illinois
    2. West Virginia
    3. Rhode Island
    4. Pennsylvania
    5. California
    6. Florida
    7. Montana
    8. New York
    9. Maryland
    10. Alabama

    West Virginia businesses will no doubt be pleased that their state is only the second worst, which is actually an improvement over other similar studies.

    Hat tip: TortsProf Blog.

  • Alabama Trial Judge Cuts AstraZeneca Punitive Damages From $160 Million Down to $120 Million

    A few months ago, an Alabama jury awarded $40 million in compensatory damages and $175 million in punitive damages against AstraZeneca (the maker of Nexium and Crestor). Today, the San Jose Mercury News is reporting that the trial judge in that case has reduced the punitive damages down to $120 million, but left the rest of the award intact. That brings the ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages down to three-to-one, but AstraZeneca will undoubtedly argue on appeal that the maximum amount of punitive damages is $40 million, citing the language in State Farm v. Campbell that supports the imposition of a one-to-one limit in cases with “substantial” compensatory damages.