According to the online docket, Ford has filed a petition for rehearing in the Buell-Wilson case, which we have previously blogged about here, here, and here.
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Texas Court of Appeals Reverses Punitive Damages Award Against Exxon Mobil
Today, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals in Texas issued its opinion in Exxon Mobil Corporation v. Altimore, reversing a punitive damages award against Exxon Mobil in an asbestos case.
In this “take home” or “secondhand” asbestos exposure case, the plaintiff claimed she developed mesothelioma as a result of exposure to asbestos dust that her husband brought home on his clothes. The plaintiff’s husband had worked with asbestos at an Exxon refinery from 1942 through 1977. The jury found Exxon guilty of malice and awarded roughly $1 million in punitive damages.
In Texas, malice requires a showing that the defendant knowingly subjected the plaintiff to an extreme degree of risk. The appellate court found that the record contained insufficient evidence to support the conclusion that Exxon was aware of an extreme degree of risk to the plaintiff during the relevant time period. First, the court noted that although asbestos had been associated with health risks since at least the 1930’s, knowledge about the risks evolved over time. During the relevant time period, 1942 to 1972, scientists incorrectly believed that certain exposure levels would be safe. The court also found that the plaintiff had failed to introduce a single study from the relevant time period showing that family members of refinery workers were exposed to an extreme degree of risk.
This opinion provides an interesting contrast to the recent California opinion in Garza v. Asbestos Corporation. As we mentioned last week, the court in that case affirmed a punitive damages award based solely on the fact that studies in the 1930’s and earlier had established a link between asbestos and health problems. Unlike the Altimore court, the Garza court did not take into account the evolving understanding of asbestos hazards, and did not consider whether the defendant knew during the relevant time period that the exposure levels involved created a risk to the plaintiff’s health.
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U.S. Supreme Court Will Consider McGee v. Tucoemas Federal Credit Union Cert. Petition on April 11
The U.S. Supreme Court has placed McGee v. Tucoemas Federal Credit Union on its April 11 conference list, according to the on-line docket. As we previously blogged, here and here, the question presented is: “Federal credit unions are federal instrumentalities chartered under the Federal Credit Union Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1751 to 1795k. Does their authority under that Act to ‘sue and be sued,’ 12 U.S.C. § 1757(2), waive their immunity as federal instrumentalities from punitive damage claims? The decision of the Court of Appeal of the State of California, which allowed the punitive damage claims here, declined to follow decisions of the Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits of the United States Court of Appeals.”
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U.S. Supreme Court Will Consider Exxon v. Grefer Cert. Petition on April 18
The U.S. Supreme Court has placed Exxon v. Grefer on its April 18 conference list, according to the court’s online docket for that case. As we mentioned in a prior post, this case involves a $112 million punitive damages award and involves the following issues (as framed by Exxon’s cert. petition):
1. Whether the Court of Appeal on remand denied due process when it continued to punish ExxonMobil for harm to nonparties, left intact a punitive damages award without finding that ExxonMobil’s conduct was reprehensible as it affected plaintiffs, and held that the jury could “consider the harm suffered by both parties and non-parties regardless of the type or similarity of harm suffered.”
2. Whether, contrary to the decisions of other federal and state appellate courts, a court may remedy a concededly tainted punitive damages trial by affirming the maximum punitive damages award due process permits, rather than by ordering a new trial.
3. Whether due process permits punitive damages twice the amount of compensatory damages in a case of economic injury when compensatory damages are $56 million and plaintiffs’ actual harm is no greater than $1.5 million.
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Answers to Petitions for Review in Bullock v. Philip Morris
We’ve been tracking the developments in Bullock v. Philip Morris, including the petitions for review filed by both parties. Now the parties have filed their answers to the opposing petitions. The plaintiff’s answer agrees with Philip Morris that review should be granted on the first issue raised in Philip Morris’s petition, namely, the proper scope of retrial after an appellate court reverses a punitive damages award because of a legal error (specifically, the failure to instruct the jury not to impose punishment for harm nonparties). Philip Morris, on the other hand, takes the position that none of the plaintiff’s issues merit review.
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Woody Allen Sues American Apparel for Punitive Damages
According to Variety, famed director and actor Woody Allen has sued American Apparel, Inc. for compensatory and punitive damages: “The lawsuit complained of a billboard featuring a frame from ‘Annie Hall,’ a film that won Allen a best director Oscar. The image showed Allen dressed as a Hasidic Jew with a long beard and black hat and Yiddish text meaning ‘the holy rebbe.’ The words ‘American Apparel’ also were on the billboard. The billboard falsely implied that Allen sponsored, endorsed or was associated with American Apparel, said the lawsuit, which seeks at least $10 million in compensatory damages and unspecified punitive damages.”
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The Puzzle of Punitive Damages
Jacob Sullum at Reason has posted commentary on the recent New York Times article on punitive damages that we blogged about here. Sullum argues: “Last week The New York Times ran a front-page story by Adam Liptak that describes the dismay caused in foreign courts by the American concept of punitive damages. It’s not just that such awards are sometimes jaw-droppingly high; it’s also that they serve a purpose, punishment/retribution, that is usually said to be a function of the criminal justice system, where defendants enjoy stronger procedural safeguards than they do in civil courts. Punitive damages—which are not really damages at all, since compensation for injuries is not the goal—invite juries to pick numbers out of thin air, with little or no statutory guidance, as an expression of how reprehensible they think the defendant’s conduct was. And while the Supreme Court has said the Due Process Clause imposes some limits on the ratio of punitive to compensatory damages, it has not taken the next logical step of saying that when the goal is explicitly punishment rather than compensation, defendants should receive all the protections they would get in a criminal case, including a higher burden of proof for the accuser.”
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Punitive Damages Articles from Charleston Law Review Symposium Now Available Online
Our prior posts have discussed some of the papers generated by the Charleston Law Review symposium on punitive damages last September. TortsProfBlog now has this post linking to online versions of all the articles from the symposium volume of the Charleston Law Review.
Here are the titles of all articles (see the TortsProfBlog post for the links):
Anthony J. Sebok, After Philip Morris v. Williams: What is Left of the “Single-Digit” Ratio?
Anthony J. Franze, Clinging to Federalism: How Reluctance to Amend State Law-Based Punitive Damages Procedures Impedes Due Process.
Neil Vidmar & Matthew W. Wolfe, Fairness Through Guidance: Jury Instruction on Punitive Damages after Philip Morris v. Wiliams.
Christopher J. Robinette, Peace: A Public Purpose for Punitive Damages.
Keith N. Hylton, Due Process and Punitive Damages: An Economic Approach.
Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, Putting the Cart Before the Horse: The Prejudicial Practice of a “Reverse Bifurcation” Approach to Punitive Damages.
Elizabeth J. Cabraser & Robert J. Nelson, Class Action Treatment of Punitive Damages Issues After Philip Morris v. Williams: We Can Get There From Here.
Byron G. Stier, Now It’s Personal: Punishment and Mass Tort Litigation After Philip Morris v. Williams.
Michael L. Rustad, The Uncert-Worthiness of the Court’s Unmaking of Punitive Damages.
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U.S. Supreme Court Holds That Punitive Damages Are Subject to the Eighth Amendment
In 1989, in Browning Ferris Industries v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., the Supreme Court held that the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eight Amendment does not apply to awards of punitive damages in cases between private parties. Today, the Court surprisingly overturned Browning-Ferris and held that punitive damages imposed by state courts are in fact governed by the Eighth Amendment. It remains to be seen how the overlay of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence will impact the ratio analysis set forth in State Farm v. Campbell and other cases; a colorable argument can be made that any awards exceeding compensatory damages are inherently excessive and therefore unconstitutional. Read the Court’s opinion here.